Holly Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., and Jon Fischer, and Patrick Benedict : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2003
Holly Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc.,
and Jon Fischer, and Patrick Benedict : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randy Dryer; Parson, Behle & Latimer; attorneys for appellee.
Don L. Davis, Robert C. Alden, Derek L. Davis; Byrd, Davis, Eisenberg, Walter & Furman; Liz King
Burgess; Clawson & Burgess; attorneys for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, No. 20030854.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2470
NO. 20030854 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stephen L. Henroid presiding 
HOLLY WAYMENT 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
CLEAR CHANNEL BROADCASTING, 
INC., A Texas Corporation dba KTVX 
Channel 4, and JON FISCHER, and 
PATRICK BENEDICT, Individuals 
Defendants and Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
m 10 20M 
RANDY DRYER 
PARSON, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 85145 
Telephone: 801-532-1234 
DON L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 0548000) 
ROBERT C. ALDEN (TX Bar No. 0097680) 
DEREK L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 00793590) 
BYRD, DAVIS, EISENBERG, WALTER 
& FURMAN, L.L.P. 
707 West 34th Street 
Austin, Texas 78705 
Telephone: 512-454-3751 
Facsimile: 512-451-5857 
LIZ KING BURGESS (4863) 
CLAWSON BURGESS, LLC 
350 South 400 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801-322-5000 
Facsimile: 801-322-1471 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/ 
APPELLANT 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/ 
APPELLEE 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
NO. 20030854 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The Honorable Stephen L. Henroid presiding 
HOLLY WAYMENT 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
CLEAR CHANNEL BROADCASTING, 
INC., A Texas Corporation dba KTVX 
Channel 4, and JON FISCHER, and 
PATRICK BENEDICT, Individuals 
Defendants and Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF 
RANDY DRYER 
PARSON, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 85145 
Telephone: 801-532-1234 
DON L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 0548000) 
ROBERT C. ALDEN (TX Bar No. 0097680) 
DEREK L. DAVIS (TX Bar No. 00793590) 
BYRD, DAVIS, EISENBERG, WALTER 
& FURMAN, L.L.P. 
707 West 34th Street 
Austin, Texas 78705 
Telephone: 512-454-3751 
Facsimile: 512-451-5857 
LIZ KING BURGESS (4863) 
CLAWSON BURGESS, LLC 
350 South 400 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801-322-5000 
Facsimile: 801-322-1471 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT/ 
APPELLANT 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/ 
APPELLEE 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents 1 
Table of Authorities 2 
Argument 3 
Reply Issue No. 1: 
Ms, Wayment is neither a "general purpose" public figure nor a 
"limited purpose" public figure as defined by the United States 
Supreme Court 3 
A. Ms. Wayment had not achieved general fame or 
notoriety in the community, and did not have pervasive 
involvement in the affairs of society .4 
B. Since there was no "public controversy/' Ms. 
Wayment is not a "limited purpose" public figure 7 
Reply Issue No. 2: 
The qualified privilege is defeated by evidence that Mr. Benedict 
knowingly made false, defamatory statements about the reasons for 
Ms. Wayment's leaving her employment 9 
Conclusion..... 10 
Wavmentv CCn ** *i - n~~u. n-:s 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 508 F. Supp. 1249, (D. Mass. 1981). . 7 
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980) 7 
Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 A.D.2d294 (1981) 8 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982) 7 
Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, (1974)... 3,4 
Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693 (1979) 8 
Hutchinson v.Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111(1978) .....7 
Russell v. Daily Spectrum, 842 P.Wd 896 (Utah 1992) 3, 10 
San Antonio Express v. Dracos, 922 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App. 1996) 5, 6 
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958 (1976) 8 
Waldbaum v. Fair child Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C.Cir. 1980) 7 
Law Review Articles 
Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 906, 916 (1984) 4 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
It is axiomatic that in reviewing a summary judgment, this Court views all the 
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to he nonmoving party. 
Defendant's factual and legal arguments ignore this standard and would have the 
Court decide the case taking its version of the facts as true while ignoring the 
evidence proffered by Plaintiff. It is important to remember that Ms. Wayment had 
simply approached her managers with an idea for a public relations/ community 
involvement project for the station. She did not know that another reporter had 
already been hired to take over her health reporting. Her idea was used as a pretext 
for her firing, then used as the basis for defamatory statements which ruined her 
reputation and served as a rationale for management letting her go. 
The remainder of this reply brief will be limited to addressing the arguments 
offered by Defendant regarding Ms. Wayment's status as a public figure and the 
operation of the qualified privilege. 
REPLY ISSUE NO. 1: 
Ms. Wayment is neither a "general purpose" public figure nor a 
"limited purpose" public figure as defined by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
As the Court noted in Russell v. Daily Spectrum, 842 P.2d 896, 903 n.20 (Utah 
1992) citing, Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974), "[f]or the heightened 
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protection of actual malice to apply, a plaintiff must be either a public figure or a 
public official. A public figure is one who has either (1) attained special prominence 
in the affairs of socity and thus assumes a public figure role voluntarily, or (2) thrust 
himself or herself to the forefront of public controversies in order to affect the 
outcome of those controversies.5' "Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety 
in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life." Gertz, 418 U.S. 
at 352. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, Ms. Wayment is neither a general purpose 
public figure nor a limited purpose public figure. 
A. Ms. Wayment had not achieved general fame or notoriety in the 
community, and did not have pervasive involvement in the affairs of 
society. 
In Gertz, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court; described general purpose, or all purpose, 
public figures as follows: "For the most part those who attain this status have assumed 
roles of special prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such 
persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes." 
Id. at 345. As one commentator has phrased it: 
"This description of a public figure immediately calls to mind certain 
types of individuals: the chairman of the board of General Motors; the 
president of the AFL-CIO; the archbishop of Boston; the publisher of 
the New York Times; the anchorman of the CBS Evening News; the 
chairman of the Democratic National Committee; the president of 
Harvard University; the head of the Ford Foundation; and so on. In 
each of these and in innumerable other cases, a nominally private 
person exercises as much, if not more, influence on the determination 
of public policy issues as do many public officials." 
Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 906, 916 (1984). 
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Ms. Wayment is not such figure; she was the health reporter for a local 
television station. In the hierarchy of KTVX, she was not a weekday anchor, nor was 
she even a weekend anchor, she was simply a reporter that covered health stories. 
Defendants failed to present evidence that Ms. Wayment had achieved "general fame 
or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society" 
such as to warrant general purpose public figure status. 
There is no judicially-formulated rule that journalists and television reporters 
are general purpose public figures. Defendant cites an intermediate appellate court in 
Texas to argue for this proposition. Looking more closely at the facts of that case, 
we find that it is the exception, rather than the rule. 
In San Antonio Express News v. Draco, 922 S.W.2d 242 (Tex.App.—San 
Antonio 1996, no writ.), the plaintiff in a defamation case was Ted Draco, a 
television journalist.1 Draco had quit his job at KENS-TV and his departure was 
reported unfavorably in Defendant's newspaper, the San Antonio Express News. Mr. 
Draco was notorious for his own brand of "gotcha" journalism, "he developed highly 
popular and innovative news segments, both nationally and locally." Id. at 253. 
"His 'Eyewitness-Wants-to-Know' segment on KENS-TV became 
'one of the highest rated news segments in San Antonio and 
'received more view response than any segment in the South Texas 
market.' The 'Eyewitness-Wants-to-Know5 format was also highly 
accusatory in nature. To be the subject of one of these programs was 
not good news to the individual involved. There were no 
compliments, and the criticisms were harsh. Both private and public 
figures were put on the rack by Dracos, who did not hesitate to lay 
on the verbal whip." 
1
 As denoted by its "no writ" designation, this case was never reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court. 
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Id. "He had frequently been featured in San Antionio newspapers." Id. And the 
coverage was not favorable, as it called into question whether the alleged scandals he 
covered were real or fabricated. Id. 
This was not the first time he had quit his job at KENS-TV, and it was not the 
first time he had sued the newspaper for defamation. In the prior litigation, "the 
parties had stipulated as evidenced by the signature of their counsel ... that for the 
purposes of this lawsuit Plaintiff was a public figure as that term is defined by the 
United States Supreme Court in the cases of New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz 
v. Welch." M 
In short, Holly Wayment is no Ted Dracos. For obvious reasons, the court in 
San Antonio Express News v. Draco had no trouble finding that Ted Dracos was a 
general purpose public figure—he had stipulated to that fact in a prior defamation 
case. Furthermore, the finding that he was a public figure is nearly gratuitous on the 
part of the Texas court since it had aheady determined that the allegedly defamatory 
statements he alleged were, in fact, substantially true. This case does not stand for 
the proposition that all television journalists are general purpose public figures. 
Finally, the cases cited by the Dracos court do not stand for the proposition 
that journalists and television reporters are routinely considered general purpose 
public figures. To the contrary, the Dracos court makes no such claim, and the cases 
it cites more often refer to journalist who became limited purpose public figures 
because they had injected themselves into ongoing public controversies. Id. at 252-
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53. This distinction is crucial: a limited purpose public figure is one who has thrust 
himself into the forefront of a particular public controversy. This is an occupational 
hazard for journalists covering controversial events. In Ms. Wayment's case, 
however, there never was a public controversy. 
B. Since there was no "public controversy/' Ms. Wayment is not a 
"limited purpose" public figure. 
A "limited purpose" public figures is a person who thrusts "himself-or herself 
to the forefront of public controversies in order to affect the outcome of those 
controversies.'5 Russell supra. A public controversy is "a specific public dispute that 
has foreseeable and substantial ramifications beyond its immediate participants." 
Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C.Cir. 1980.) 
The defamation itself cannot create the public controversy. "Clearly, those 
charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by 
making the claimant a public figure." Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. I l l , 135 
(1978). 
The controversy must pre-exist the defamatory statement. Fitzgerald v. 
Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668-69 (4th Cir. 1982) (extensive press coverage 
of the military applications of dolphin technology pre-existed defendants statements 
on that topic); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 591 
(1st Cir. 1980) (no pre-existing controversy because no evidence anyone discussed 
plaintiffs fishing boats prior to defendant's criticism); Waldbaum v. Fairchild 
Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297, 1299 (D.C. Cir.) (controversies involving 
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plaintiff developed before defendant's allegedly defamatory publication), cert, denied, 
I 
449 U.S. 898 (1980); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 508 F. 
Supp. 1249, 1272-73 (D. Mass. 1981) (defendant entered pre-existing controversy 
precipitated by plaintiffs advertising campaign); Fairley v. Peekskill Star Corp., 83 < 
A.D.2d 294, 445 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1981) (no public controversy existed in which 
plaintiff could have participated); Greenberg v. CBS, 69 A.D.2d 693, 419 N.Y.S.2d 
988, 993-94 (1979) (no public debate over amphetamines when plaintiff doctor 
prescribed amphetamine-type drugs for which he was criticized). 
In the present case there simply was no pre-existing public controversy. Ms. 
Wayment approached management with an idea for helping kids who had cancer. 
Nothing ever became of it, except that it was used as a pretext for firing Ms. 
Wayment since KTVX had recently hired a more prominent journalist from another 
station to take her place. In fact, even after the defamation took place, there was no 
public controversy. Ms. Wayment's departure did not receive any contemporaneous 
media attention.2 After this lawsuit was filed, she was interviewed by newspaper 
reporters; but responding to a newspaper's inquires after a lawsuit is filed does not 
turn a private dispute into a public controversy. Time, Inc. v. Firestone^ 424 U.S. 448 
(1976). 
Because Ms. Wayment did not inject herself into a pre-existing public 
controversy, she is not a limited purpose public figure. 
2
 This further underscores the fact that Ms. Wayment is not a general purpose public figure. 
a 
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REPLY ISSUE NO. 2 
The qualified privilege is defeated by evidence that Mr. Benedict 
knowingly made false, defamatory statements about the reasons for 
Ms. Wayment's leaving her employment. 
Defendant argues that an independent basis for affirming the 
summary judgment is that the defamation was protected by a qualified 
privilege between an employer and an employee. This is not correct because 
Mr. Benedict knew the defamatory statements were false, and a "knowing" 
mental state satisfies the common-law and statutory standards for malice. 
Mr. Benedict told Jeremy Castellano, a photographer at Channel 4, 
that Ms. Wayment "abused her contacts as a reporter" and "she was in charge 
of a large sum of money"; and explained she was fired because "you can't do 
stories on a place you're receiving money from and just a lot about being 
unethical." (Castellano, p. 35,11. 15 - 24, p. 36,1.2). In his deposition, Mr. 
Benedict admitted that he knew Ms. Wayment had "not accepted any 
monetary remuneration from The Huntsman." (Benedict, p. 13,1. 11) 
"The appropriate degree of malice that must be proven to successfully 
overcome the statutory privilege is the common law standard from which the 
statute derived. This standard creates, in effect, an absolute privilege of a 
defendant's statements unless the statements were made with ill will, were 
excessively published, or the defendant did not reasonably believe his or 
her statements were true." Russell, 842 P.2d at 904-5 (emphasis supplied). 
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The summary judgment evidence in this case demonstrates that Mr. Benedict 
I 
knew his statements were not true. Thus., the standard for common-law malice 
is satisfied. 
CONCLUSION i 
For purposes of this litigation, Ms. Wayment is neither a general purpose nor 
limited purpose public figure. Therefore, the constitutional actual malice standards 
i 
do not apply to her defamation action. Even if they did, however, such standards 
would be satisfied given the evidence that defamatory statements were made with 
actual knowledge of their falsity. Actual knowledge of falsity also satisfies the 
common law definition of malice, so as to overcome any qualified privileges. 
The granting of summary judgment in this case was inappropriate, and Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that the judgment be reversed and this case be remanded for trial 
on the merits. 
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